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Russia can no longer be considered a world superpower, but it remains a great power in 
terms of strategic global security.  Russia’s importance is based on its nuclear arsenal and 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This research analyzed arms 
control and ballistic missile defense (BMD) in order to explain the success and failure of 
cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.  Utilizing 
international relations theory, realist and constructivist frameworks  were applied to two 
separate case studies: U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 
and U.S.-Russian failure to cooperate on BMD. 
Each case was started with material factors that opened the opportunity for the 
Soviet and Russian Federation elite to be responsive to new ideas.  The elite then turned 
to the state’s intellectual entrepreneurs to find new ideas.  In the case of the Soviet era, 
the elite chose to cooperate due to the influence of the international organizations they 
were associated with.  In the present day, the elite, many of whom have a background in 
the Soviet and Russian Federation secret service, have chosen to defect from cooperation 
due to the socialization received during their time as KGB or FSB officers. 
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Famed international relations scholar Robert Jervis wrote that on the international 
stage the gain in security of one state often inadvertently threatens the security of another 
state, and that “although actors may know that they seek a common goal, they may not be 
able to reach it.”1 For the United States and the Russian Federation cooperation has been 
sporadic at best, and non-existent at its worst.  I will analyze the relationship of the 
United States and the Russian Federation by looking at where cooperation has occurred, 
most notably on arms control, and where the two states have failed to reach an agreement 
on ballistic missile defense.  In both cases material deficiencies provide the starting point 
that led the ruling elite to turn to the states intellectual entrepreneurs, many of whom 
were in positions of power, in order to solve the state’s material deficiencies.  Soviet 
elites chose to cooperate with the United States because of the international organizations 
they were involved with provided the elite with ideas to implement economic reform that 
lead to cooperation with the west on arms control.  President Vladimir Putin and the 
current cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs chose to follow a different path.  I argue that 
the failure to cooperate, while based on material deficiencies, is due to current Russian 
intellectual entrepreneurs association with organizations whose purpose in the past was 
the strategic and political safety of the ruling party.  In 2006 the number of people with a 
background in the security services (KGB, FSB, or armed forces) had reached 77 percent 
of Russia’s top 1,016 governmental positions.2  The background of these new ruling elite 
has shaped how they respond to material and external threats to the Russian state.   
This chapter will first outline why the topic is important in today’s international 
environment.  Second I will look at some of the problems and hypotheses associated with 
the topic.  Third, a short literature review to provide an overarching review of topics I 
will further develop in the subsequent chapters.  Finally, I provide an overview of the 
methods and sources I used as well as a breakdown of the topic of discussion for each 
chapter. 
                                                 
1 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January, 1978): 
168 & 170. 
2 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs 19, no.4 
(2003): 289; Illarionov, “The Siloviki in Charge,” 70-71. 
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A. IMPORTANCE 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia can no longer be considered a 
world superpower.  However, Russia is still a great power nation when it comes to 
strategic global security.  Russia’s importance is based on its nuclear arsenal and 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.  Russia’s cooperation with the 
United States continues to provide support for arms reductions and nuclear non-
proliferation on the global stage.  However, the bilateral and multilateral treaties on the 
reduction of nuclear arms and nuclear non-proliferation are being threatened, from the 
Russian standpoint, by U.S. plans for a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
system. 
In 2002, when President Bush withdrew the United States from the Anti-Ballitsic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty Russia warned “that the loss of the treaty would undermine the 
nuclear strategic stability on which the delicate balance of terror had rested during the 
Cold War,” claimed that a world without the ABM treaty would jeopardize the other 
standing arms control agreements – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II), 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), and even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).3   
In the post-Soviet era, when it comes to global and regional security the benefits 
of cooperation outweigh the benefits of non-cooperation.  By looking at the historic 
precedence of cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and arms reduction treaties 
between Washington and Moscow it allows for an examination of the conditions and 
policies that created cooperation.   Just as important is looking at the conditions and 
policies of Moscow and Washington where cooperation has failed.  The analysis here 
provides a way to look at the relationship between the United States and the Russian 
Federation in order to better understand how to achieve more cooperation in the future.  
The ultimate purpose is to show how material factors and ideas work together to explain 
the success and failure of cooperation between the United States and the Russian 
Federation. 
                                                 
3 Celeste A. Wallander, “Russia’s New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Debate,” 
Current History 99, no. 639 (October 2000),339. 
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B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Relations between the United States and the Russian Federation since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union have been tenuous at best. While there have been periods of 
cooperation, arms control and anti-terrorism/counterinsurgency, the majority of the time, 
the two countries have looked at each other through the lens of the cold war and 
ideological differences.  Despite the cold war being over for more than twenty years, the 
mutual distrust between the two nations is still part of their working relationship.  
There are two major problems when analyzing and explaining the patterns of the 
strategic relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation.  First, the 
future of cooperation on arms reductions and nuclear non-proliferation, are being 
threatened by the areas of non-cooperation, European missile defense.  Russia repeatedly 
claimed that any change to the ABM treaty would result in the end of cooperation in arms 
control and potentially Russian involvement in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); 
however, in 2010 President Obama and then President Medvedev signed into law the new 
START treaty.  Are U.S. and Russian differences on ABM a true point of contention that 
would reverse the years of cooperation on arms control?  How would this reversal in 
cooperation effect Russian security overall?  What does the Russian Federation hope to 
gain in the long run by reversing its global stance on arms reduction and nuclear non-
proliferation?  What kind of message would their withdrawal from START, INF or even 
the NPT have on nations like North Korea and Iran, who are advancing their nuclear and 
missile programs?     
Second, international relations (IR) theory continues to provide hypotheses and 
predictions when it comes to how states interact with one another.  For example, 
International relations theory provides reasoning as to why a nation wishes to ally itself 
with other nations, and why a nation would feel threated by purely defensive weapons. 
Cooperation theorists believe that cooperation is possible in an anarchic world.  They 
believe that world politics is not a zero-sum game and that nations have an incentive to 
realize the benefits that come from long term mutual cooperation through the knowledge 
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that the “two players” will meet again.4 The relationship between the United States and 
Russia can be characterized as a long term relationship, with the “shadow of the future” 
indefinite as long as Russia maintains its nuclear arsenal and permanent seat on the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council. Can IR theory provide answers to why 
Washington and Moscow cooperate in some areas and do not cooperation in others? 
What were the conditions that created cooperation and what are the conditions that 
created non-cooperation?  Can IR theory provide a mechanism on which Russia and the 
United States can learn from their cooperative relationship on nuclear non-proliferation 
and arms control and apply it to their non-cooperative relationship on missile defense?    
Is Russia’s isolation from cooperative relationships with the West on ballistic missile 
defense due to internal or external factors (state or systemic level of analysis)?  
This research shows that cooperation between the United States and Russia is 
possible on missile defense, but unlikely under the current material deficiencies and 
make-up of the Russian ruling elite.  However, we first have to understand why the 
United States and Russia have cooperated in nuclear non-proliferation and arms control 
yet failed to cooperate on missile defense.  Russia has cooperated in the areas of nuclear 
non-proliferation and arms control because it believes that it will create a nuclear parity 
with the United States by reducing the number of nuclear weapons on both sides 
therefore maintaining the balance of power; also, arguably, the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
guarantees no other state will acquire nuclear weapons to threaten that balance of power.  
The missile defense system in Europe is perceived by the Kremlin as directed at them 
despite the repeated claims by Washington that “missile defense in Europe poses no 
threat to [Russia’s] strategic deterrent.”5  This concerns Russia because if missile defense 
is capable of altering the strategic balance of power, its strategic deterrence will no longer 
be credible.     
In order for cooperation to occur in the area of missile defense the United States 
and Russia have to understand that the delicate balance of power can be altered due to 
                                                 
4 Daniel W. Drezner, Theories of International Politics and Zombies (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011), 47; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 12. 
5 Missile Defense Agency, The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe Fact Sheet 
(Washington, DC: 2009), http://www.mda.mil/system/paa.html. 
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decisions to increase defensive capabilities just as much as decisions to increase offensive 
capabilities.  Also, that mutual defection from cooperative agreements has the potential to 
affect other agreements thus reducing the security of all parties involved. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cooperation and non-cooperation has been the theme of relations between the 
United States and Russia, more so since the election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency 
of Russia in 2000.  The brief review of the literature below will provide a foundation on 
which to determine the conditions for cooperation between the United States and Russia 
on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, and what conditions have prevented 
cooperation between the two governments on European missile defense. First, a brief 
history of the cooperation between Washington and Moscow, then a look at the issues of 
non-cooperation and the positions that each side are taking, finally an analytical look at 
these areas of cooperation and non-cooperation.  Utilizing international relations (IR) 
theory, I hope to establish the conditions that created cooperation in the areas of non-
proliferation and arms control.   I will then attempt to apply those conditions to the area 
of missile defense to see if cooperation will emerge from the mutual defection of both 
Russia and the United States.  
The election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 
2000 ushered in a new era of relations between Russia and the United States.  Putin and 
United States President George W. Bush both inherited a historical sense of cooperation 
dating back to before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  The first steps toward a 
deeper cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1963 with 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which was soon followed with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1968.  The first arms reduction treaties began in 1972 with the series of 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II).  The Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
(INF) treaty of 1987 would eliminate intermediate nuclear weapons on the European 
continent.  The next series of treaties, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and 
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II) in 1991 and 1993 would continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons between 
the old Cold War adversaries.6   
The collapse of the Soviet Union created a need for a different kind of 
cooperation.  The Nunn-Lugar Act, or the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, 
was initiated as a measure to secure nuclear material and facilities during the era of 
political, economic and social crisis among the former Soviet states.7  Anton Khlopkov et 
al. argue that through projects like CTR, the Russian Federation and the United States 
have “increased mutual confidence, established regular contacts between Russian and 
U.S. government experts and nuclear scientists, and enriched overall nuclear security 
technologies and procedures, all of which has ultimately led to the sustainable progress in 
nuclear security.”8  These programs have also provided an important means of 
maintaining the cooperation between Russia and the United States through a bilateral 
arrangement creating an environment for future work on a range of nuclear non-
proliferation problems.9  Jim Nichol echos this sentiment in his Congressional Research 
Service report from February 2011.  He states that the CTR’s use in Russia is an example 
that can be used as a model for future “nonproliferation and anti-terrorism assistance to 
nations around the world.”10 
Despite all the optimism from the aforementioned group of authors, failure to 
cooperate in the area of European missile defense has the potential to undo much of the 
work that was established with the first steps towards nuclear threat reductions in the 
1960’s.  According to Celeste Wallander, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the 
                                                 
6 “Nuclear Disarmament,” Wikipedia, last modified on March 4, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_disarmament#Arms_reduction_treaties. 
7 Anton Khlopkov, Dmity Konukhov, Bryan Lee, Stephanie Lieggi, Miles Pomper, Robert Shaw, and 
Elena Sokova, “U.S. – Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda: Recommendation 
for U.S. – Russian cooperation in strengthening nuclear security in the former Soviet states and Southeast 
Asia,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 2012, pg. 7, 
http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/120705_us_russia_nuclear_security_partnership.pdf. 
8 Anton Khlopkov, “U.S. – Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda,” Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, June 2012, pg 6. 
9 Ibid., 8. 
10 Jim Nichol, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests,” Congressional 
Research Service, February 1, 2011, RL33407, 45. 
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backbone of strategic stability and is the foundation on which the array of arms reduction 
and nuclear non-proliferation treaties has been built.  In 2000 the view of former Foreign 
Minister, Igor Ivanov, was that if the ABM Treaty was dissolved then the “interconnected 
system [would] collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.”11 In 
2012 Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that U.S. plans for a European missile 
defense system still “affects the strategic nuclear deterrence forces that only Russia 
possesses in that theater, and upsets the military-political balance established over 
decades.”12 He further suggests that cooperation is possible and that if cooperation could 
be achieved it would “[open] the floodgates for building a qualitatively new model of 
cooperation, similar to an alliance”;  but, if cooperation failed then Russia would respond 
with its declared countermeasures should the American deployment of missile defense 
reach a scale that would demand a Russian response.13 
The stated reason for the United States National Missile Defense (NMD) system 
is that the “United States is threatened by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
and missile technology by certain ‘states of concern’.”14  In the view of the Russians this 
is an unrealistic fear.  According to Wallander, the disagreement to the United States 
withdrawal from the ABM is complicated and requires an understanding of Russia’s 
national security issues, status of its military, foreign policy doctrine, capabilities of 
Russian conventional and nuclear forces, and the role that nuclear weapons play in 
Russia’s defense posture.15  Research will show that the Soviet Union was capable of 
meeting the new lower nuclear numbers because, despite the decline soviet material 
                                                 
11 Igor Ivanov, “The Missile-Defense Mistake,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 5 (September-October 2000): 
15; Wallander, “Russia’s New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Debate,” 339. 
12 Vladamir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” Ria Novosti February 27, 2012, 
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120227/171547818.html.  
13 Ibid.; For Russian proposed response to American deployment of BMD systems see Stephen 
Pfifer’s article “Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Contention” found on the Brookings Institute’s 
website: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/05/08-missile-defense-pifer. Highlights include 
deployment of S-400 and S-500 interceptors; developing the capability to attack NATO control systems for 
missile defense; and deploying modern weapons in locations where they could “take out any part of the 
U.S. missile defense system in Europe.  One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in 
Kaliningrad.”   
14 Wallander, “Russia’s New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Debate,” 339. 
15 Ibid.. 
 8 
decline the conventional capability of the USSR was still a capable deterrent.  Nuclear 
arms talks maintained parity with the United States and as such made sense for 
Gorbachev and his cadre of policy-makers.   
Today, Russia’s continued material decline is now affecting its conventional 
armed forces, which has led Russian analysts to conclude that “Russia’s conventional 
forces are insufficient to defeat external aggression and internal conflicts.”16  As a result 
of the decline in their conventional forces’ capabilities to defend the homeland, Russia 
has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed conflict.  Wallander 
argues that the consensus is that the Russian Federation will rely on its nuclear arsenal for 
its defense, escalation control, and deterrence policies.
17
  For Russia, the possible threat 
that the American Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) poses to Russia’s ICBM deterrent is 
of great concern because it could “make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US 
nuclear (or massive conventional) attack.”18 
The proposed Russian response if the ABM Treaty is renegotiated with a limited 
U.S. NMD system would require a recalculation of the Russian retaliatory capability.  If 
the U.S. develops a NMD system then the Russians have stated that they would begin 
arming the Topol-M missile with a multiple warhead system (In 2007 Russia began tests 
of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was designated RS-24 with 
deployment beginning in 2010.)19   By creating a multiple warhead capable rocket, the 
Russians believe they will be able to counter the defensive capability of the U.S./NATO 
ABM system.  Also of concern is that as the United States deploys an NMD system what 
will the Chinese response be?  Russia assumes that with a U.S. NMD system deployed 
the Chinese will respond with an increase in deployment of missiles to counter the new 
American defense capability.  Russia will then respond with an increase in their number 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 340. 
17 Ibid.; Nikoli Sokov, “The New 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle,” Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, February 5, 2010, 
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm. 
18 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” Defense and Security Analysis 28, no. 1 
(2012), 56. 
19 Wallander, “Russia’s New Security Policy,” 341. 
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of deployed warheads in order to maintain a credible deterrence.  This places the New 
START and previous START, SORT, and SALT reductions in jeopardy.20   
International Relations theories offer a way to analyze and debate the possible 
outcomes of interactions between two states.  The relationship between the United States 
and Russia allows for a real-time look at how some of the major theories play out in a 
real-world scenario.  No paradigm or theory can fully explain the complex relationship 
between the United States and the Russian Federation. The realist Stephen Walt 
described this need to keep an open mind and to engage different theories when he wrote:  
Our understanding would be impoverished were our thinking confined to 
only one of them.  The “compleat [sic] diplomat” of the future should 
remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, 
keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally 
reflect on constructivism’s vision of change.21 
Realism and the power of material factors and interests defined in terms of power 
along with Russian concerns with the balance of power provide the overarching rational 
for the Russian response.  However, the social construct of a nation’s policymakers 
determines how a given state reacts to the material issues they are facing.  As will be 
shown later the social construct of the Russian elite that now inhabit the Kremlin is based 
on KGB and FSB ideology and has a profound effect on Russian policy-makers decision 
making.   
Russia’s realist dilemma stems from its material deficiencies as compared to the 
United Sates.  In the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union the quality 
and quantity of the Russian conventional forces “crashed and burned.”22  President 
Vladimir Putin pointed out the deficiencies of his military by conceding the fact that the 
Russian military-industrial complex had missed in the last 30 years several modernization 
cycles.  Also, he expressed concern that the United States had surpassed the Russian 
                                                 
20 Ibid.. 
21 Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 
(Spring, 1998), 44. 
22 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation,” 
Comparative Strategy 27, no. 5 (2008): 433. 
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Federation in the development and deployment of precision guided munitions.23 Realists 
believe that in an anarchic world the “only currency that matters is power – the material 
capability to ward off pressure or coercion while being able to influence others.”24 
 In the eyes of the Russians the balance of power is shifting away from them and 
towards the United States as evidenced by Russian disapproval of Washington’s 
European missile defense plan.  The missile defense system in Europe is perceived by the 
Kremlin as directed at them despite the repeated claims by Washington that “missile 
defense in Europe poses no threat to [Russia’s] strategic deterrent.”25  This concerns 
Russia because if missile defense is capable of altering the strategic balance of power, 
their strategic deterrence will no longer be credible.  Neorealist Kenneth Waltz described 
this dilemma of one state feeling insecure because of the security of another state when 
he wrote: 
If each state, being stable, strove for security and had no designs on its 
neighbors, all states would nevertheless remain insecure; for the means of 
security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other 
states are threatened.26 
Robert Jervis argues that if one state becomes invulnerable by becoming more powerful 
than most other states – as is the case with the United States – and the “price for DD 
[defect-defect] is low, it leaves [hegemonic states] with few hostages for its good 
behavior.  Others who are more vulnerable will grow apprehensive, which will lead them 
to acquire more arms and will reduce the chances of cooperation.”27 
                                                 
23 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Putin Declares His Defense Agenda for the Next Decade,” Eurasia Daily 





24 Drezner, International Politics and Zombies, 33. 
25 Missile Defense Agency, The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe Fact Sheet 
(Washington, DC: 2009), http://www.mda.mil/system/paa.html. 
26 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 
1979), 64. 
27 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 173. 
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Understanding this idea one can see that Russia’s responses to perceived threats 
have caused the Kremlin to suspend its involvements in international treaties – such as 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty – in order to increase its material power.  
Russia continues to believe that conventional military reform, conventional rearmament 
as well as developing and deploying a new generation of nuclear weapons will regain the 
perceived loss of a balance between itself and the United States.  Because of the anarchic 
nature of the global structure, nations are unable to fully trust each other and are forced to 
be guided solely by their own self-interest in order to survive.
28
 
Realism provides the starting point for looking at the relationship between 
Washington and Moscow.  It is not, however, the complete view.  By looking at what 
Thomas Risse-Kappen describes as the “interaction of international and domestic 
influences on state behavior and take the role of ideas – knowledge, values, and strategic 
concepts,” a more complete view of Russian behavior is uncovered.  For Risse-Kappen 
“ideas intervene between material power-related factors on the one hand and state 
interests and preferences on the other.”29  Constructivism argues that state identity is 
important to understanding how a state will react to set situation.  According to Ted Hopf 
identity is one of the key fundamentals in understanding international politics and the 
nature and definition of those actors: “Constructivism . . . assumes that the selves, or 
identities, of states are a variable; they likely depend on historical, cultural, political, and 
social context.”30 In the cases that will be discussed below, I take these ideas and apply 
them to how the Soviet Union was able to cooperate with the United States at the end of 
the Cold War by signing the Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe Treaty, and how the 
interests of the new cadre of personalities that are occupying the Kremlin have responded 
toward Washington’s plan for a limited missile defense shield for Europe.  
                                                 
28 Drezner, International Politics and Zombies, 34; Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many 
Theories,” 31. 
29 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, 
and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring, 1994): 185-186. 
30 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security 23, no. 1 (Summer, 1998): 175-176. 
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For my purposes I look at the process by which the ideas were generated in the 
Soviet Union and the Russian Federation and how new ideas shaped the final foreign 
policy outcome that led to cooperation on arms control and failure to cooperate on missile 
defense.  I focus on the hypothesis of Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth that a 
“crisis creates a window of opportunity by discrediting old policies and the ideas 
associated with them.  Idea entrepreneurs then fill the gap by showing how novel ideas 
resolve strategic dilemmas.”31  These intellectual entrepreneurs may be intellectuals in the 
various bureaucracies who feed new ideas to their superiors or they are the top leaders 
themselves.  Brooks and Wohlforth further contend that the learning process – for 
individual leaders or elites – draw less on lessons from specific events but on “elite 
socialization to new norms or other cultural, social, or intellectual changes in 
international society.”32  Both ideas provide the explanative power behind the decisions 
by Mikhail Gorbachev and his group of intellectual entrepreneurs who were influenced 
toward a cooperative stance based on their socialization through their association with 
international organizations who called for cooperative arms reductions. Putin’s regime 
and his cadre of former KGB and military members, on the other hand, perceive their 
world based on the socialization they received as members of the Soviet era KGB and 
post-Soviet collapse FSB, which has influenced them to take an uncooperative approach 
to the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense systems to Europe. 
The Figure 1 diagram offers a visual representation for what has been expressed 
above and how I propose to view the two case studies. 
                                                 
31 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: 
Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter, 2000-2001): 9. 
32 Ibid., 10. 
 13 
 















access to the ruling 











D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Utilizing International Relations Theories from a historical and present day 
context, an in-depth look at the areas of cooperation between the United States and 
Russia will be evaluated.  Using the same analytical methodology, the areas of non-
cooperation will be discussed in order to find where possible common ground is on these 
strategic issues that affect global security. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will be broken down into four chapters.  This first chapter has been an 
overview of my research question and why it is important to the study of international 
relations.  The second chapter will focus on U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear/arms control 
cooperation, explaining both why cooperation occurred and how it can be used as a 
foundation for cooperation in more difficult.  The third chapter will focus on the non-
cooperation in European missile defense plans.  The fourth chapter will contain my 
concluding arguments and areas for future study. 
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II. AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
Nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and nuclear arms reduction have been the 
foundation on which strategic cooperation has been built between the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation.  President Obama has argued that 
continued U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control can help move the U.S. and 
international agenda for nuclear non-proliferation forward.  It has also been argued that 
American and Russian cooperation on arms control could strengthen U.S.-Russian 
cooperation on an array of other issues that currently plague their relationship.33  The 
cooperative foundation built during the Cold War that has extended beyond the collapse 
of the Soviet Union provides insight into how cooperation is built between opposing 
super-powers and can provide the factors needed to create cooperation in areas of 
contention between the United States and the Russian Federation.   
This chapter will show why cooperation occurred between the United States and 
the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s by showing that material deficiencies led the 
Gorbachev regime to turn to its intellectual entrepreneurs in order to find solutions to the 
Soviet material decline.  Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs then turned to international 
organizations that provided inputs that supported arms reductions in order to aide in 
achieving economic reforms.    It can be argued that because the deterrent capabilities of 
the Soviet armed forces at the time was sufficient to provide a suitable deterrent that the 
Kremlin elite were able to cooperate with the United States on the elimination of 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces from the European continent.  After all, Gorbachev did 
make unilateral cuts in the conventional forces shortly after the signing of the INF Treaty 
to further reduce the costs that the Soviet armed forces were absorbing.34  I break this 
chapter into two sections, the first section provides a historical perspective by looking at 
a brief history of U.S.-Russian arms control talks and treaties dating back to the 1960’s.  
                                                 
33 Amy F. Woolf, “The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions,” Congressional 
Research Service, November 30, 2012, R41219, 32. 
34 In December of 1988 Gorbachev announced the unilateral reduction of a half-million troops during 
a speech to the United Nations; Brooks and Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold 
War,” 31. 
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In the second section the focus will shift to the modern arms limitation treaties between 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Russian Federation.  Utilizing the research 
conducted by Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth, and Thomas Risse-Kappen and by 
taking a realist and constructivist view to connect material deficiencies to intellectual 
entrepreneurs to cooperative outcome I use the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 
as a case study to determine what factors led to successful nuclear talks between the 
Americans and the Russians at the end of the Cold War.   
A. HISTORICAL STRATEGIC COOPERATION ON ARMS CONTROL 
AND NON-PROLIFERATION.  
The United States and Russia have a deep history of strategic cooperation that 
provides a foundation for U.S.-Russian relations.  The first steps toward cooperation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1963 with the signing of the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). The PTBT prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons 
except in underground facilities. The PTBT was designed to ease the tension created by 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and to slow the arms race.35  
The PTBT was soon followed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in 1968.  
The NPT’s objective is to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons 
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further 
the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.”36 
The NPT represents a binding commitment to the overall goal of disarmament by the 
nuclear-weapon States and “declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible 
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race.”37 
The strategic cooperation formed during the 1960’s led to a policy of détente 
during the 1970’s leading to the first arms reduction talks between the United States and 
Russia.  In 1972 the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) was concluded and 
                                                 
35 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Wikipedia, accessed March 19, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partial_Test_Ban_Treaty.  
36 United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York: May 11, 1995), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml 
37 Ibid..  
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resulted in two treaties: first, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was to limit the offensive nuclear weapons of 
both countries, more specifically limiting strategic ballistic missile launchers to their 
existing number; the second was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would limit the 
number of deployed national missile defense systems - ABM systems and the Treaty will 
be discussed at length later.38  
With détente still holding, Washington and the Kremlin began further talks from 
1977 to 1979, which resulted in SALT II:  
“1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems; a ban on construction of 
new land-based ICBM launchers limits on deployment of new types of 
strategic offensive arms; and important elements of the Interim Agreement 
(e.g., relating to verification) would be incorporated in the new agreement; 
finally 2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
(ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers).”39   
Due to the Soviet invasion of the Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter withdrew 
the treaty from congressional ratification in 1979.  Despite this cooling in relations both 
the Soviet Union and the United States abided by the treaty until 1986 when President 
Ronald Reagan withdrew from SALT II due to perceived violations of the treaty by the 
USSR.  In the end the treaty was never ratified by either country but its limitations were 
maintained well into the 1980’s when the next round of talks began under new Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of Perestroika and Glasnost.40 
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty of 1987 required the United States 
and the Soviet Union to “verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.”41 The INF established an 
                                                 
38 Country Profile: Russia, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/country-
profiles/russia/nuclear/; U.S. Department of State, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I): Narative, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5191.htm. 
39 U.S. Department of State, Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) (Washington, DC: 1979), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm.  
40 Country Profile: Russia, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/country-
profiles/russia/nuclear/. 
41 “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, accessed March 
19, 2013, http://armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010. 
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unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, to include on-site inspections, laying the 
groundwork for the verification process of the subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaties.   
The next series of treaties, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and 
II) would continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons between the old Cold War 
adversaries.  START I provides a frame work for detailed verification of arms reduction 
that had not been previously seen.  Signed in 1991, START I limited both nations to 
“1600 delivery vehicles that could carry no more than 6000 ‘accountable’ warheads.”42 
START II would further limit the number to a range of 3000 to 3500 warheads.  START 
II was signed and ratified by the Russian Duma in 2000 but was never entered into force 
due to concerns over the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty in 2002.43 
Both the INF and START treaties will be discussed at length in section two of this 
chapter. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union created a need for a different kind of 
cooperation.  The Nunn-Lugar Act, or the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, 
was initiated as a measure to secure nuclear material and facilities during the era of 
political, economic and social crisis among the former Soviet states.
44
  Anton Khlopkov 
et al. argue that through projects like CTR the Russian Federation and the United States 
have “increased mutual confidence, established regular contacts between Russian and 
U.S. government experts and nuclear scientists, and enriched overall nuclear security 
technologies and procedures, all of which has ultimately led to the sustainable progress in 
nuclear security.”45  These programs have also provided an important means of 
maintaining the cooperation between Russia and the United States.  Through bilateral 
                                                 
42 Country Profile: Russia, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/country-
profiles/russia/nuclear/. 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Anton Khlopkov, Dmity Konukhov, Bryan Lee, Stephanie Lieggi, Miles Pomper, Robert Shaw, and 
Elena Sokova, “U.S. – Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda: Recommendation 
for U.S. – Russian cooperation in strengthening nuclear security in the former Soviet states and Southeast 
Asia,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 2012, 7, 
http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/120705_us_russia_nuclear_security_partnership.pdf. 
45 Anton Khlopkov et al., “U.S. – Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security 
Agenda,”Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 2012, 6. 
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arrangements an environment for future work on a range of nuclear non-proliferation 
problems has been created.
46
  Jim Nichol echoed this sentiment in his Congressional 
Research Service report from February 2011.  He states that the CTR’s use in Russia is 
an example that can be used as a model for future “nonproliferation and anti-terrorism 
assistance to nations around the world.”47 
B. MODERN NUCLEAR ARMS TREATIES AND THEORETICAL 
ANALYSIS 
1. Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 
Formal Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union began in November of 1981 and concluded in 1987.  
By the end of negotiations on the table was the elimination of an entire class of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems.  The signing of the INF Treaty would give a boost to other 
nuclear arms control negotiations that would lead to the signing and implementation of 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).  The INF Treaty also set precedence for 
negotiating stringent inspection regimes that are still relevant and part of today’s arms 
reduction treaty negotiations (New START).  In this section first I provide a brief history 
of the INF Treaty, followed by my theoretical analysis of the cooperative relationship that 
developed between the United States and the Soviet Union by utilizing realist and 
constructivist theories of international relations.   
a. Brief History of the INF 
By the Mid 1970’s the Soviets had begun a program of replacing its aging 
“medium range” nuclear delivery systems – the old SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems were 
to be replaced with the more advanced and capable SS-20 missile system.  The SS-20 
missile system had a range of 5,000 kilometers and could carry three warheads instead of 
the single warhead of the SS-4 and SS-5 systems.  The SS-20 also had a solid fuel motor 
system that sped up pre-launch preparation times.  More importantly was that the entire 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 8. 
47 Jim Nichol, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests,” Congressional 
Research Service, February 1, 2011, RL33407, 45. 
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SS-20 system was fully mobile and concealable until erected for launch.48  With its 
longer range, mobility, and three warheads capable of striking European capitals, the 
deployment of Soviet SS-20 missile systems increased the tension between Europe and 
its Soviet neighbors.  In order to calm its NATO allies the United States devised a “dual-
track” approach to its negotiations with the Soviet Union over INF missile threats.  The 
“dual-track” approach combined bilateral negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on arms control with the deployment of new US INF missile systems to 
Europe.  The “arms control” track focused on “achieving a balance at the lowest possible 
levels” while the “deployment track” set in motion the deployment of nuclear armed 
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems to the European 
continent.  If negotiations on the “arms control” track failed then the United States would 
replace the 108 Pershing IA missile systems in West Germany with 108 of the Pershing II 
missile systems.  In addition to the Pershing II systems 116 GLCM’s would be deployed 
to the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy.49 
b. 1981-1983 Negotiations 
When initial INF negotiations opened in 1981 five guiding principles 
governed the US position: (1) negotiations would be bilateral; (2) any limitation on US 
INF must be accompanied by Soviet INF limitations; (3) objective of negotiations would 
be to limit US and Soviet INF missile systems; (4) any limitations would be one of 
equality in both numbers and in rights; (5) any agreed to limitation must be verifiable.  
Just before negotiations were to open Reagan announced that the new stance of the 
Americans would be a “zero-zero” position.  In other words, the United States would not 
deploy any Pershing or GLCM systems if the Soviet Union agreed to destroy its 
inventory of SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 INF missile systems.  The initial proposal was 
                                                 
48 Avis Bohlen et al., “The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons 
Learned,” Foreign Policy at Brookings: Arms Control Papers Paper no. 9 (December 2012): 7, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/12/arms-control-pifer. 
49 Avis Bohlen et al., “The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces,” 7-8; Lisa M. Schenck and 
Robert A. Youmans, “From Start to Finish: A Historical Review of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties and 
Starting Over With the New Start,” Cardozo J. Int’l Comp. Law 20, no. 399 (2012): 426-427, 
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1104&context=faculty_publications. 
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summarily rejected by the Soviets, who counter-proposed that both parties should have 
equal numbers of medium range systems in Europe.50   
Negotiations remained non-conclusive over much of 1982, and in early 
1983 with the consent of NATO, US negotiators established an outline for an agreement 
that was other the Reagan’s initial “zero-zero” that included equal limits and rights, no 
inclusion of third party systems, and limits to apply globally.  While the sides exchanged 
several proposals, it remained clear that the two parties remained too far apart to make 
any real headway.  Adding to the stagnation was the looming deployment of US INF 
systems to Europe in late 1983.  Throughout the negotiations the Soviets had maintained 
that should the United States deploy its new INF systems to Europe the Soviets would 
withdrawal from negotiations.  True to their word the Soviets walked out of the 
negotiations in November of 1983 with the first deployment of Pershing II missile 
systems to West Germany.51 
c. 1985-1987 Negotiations 
By 1985 the Soviet Union had a new premier in the form of newly elected 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and in the United States President Ronald Reagan 
was in the first year of his second term.  This period in Soviet-US cooperative history, 
1985-1991, is marked by a transition in the relationship between the Cold War 
adversaries.  Gorbachev under the constraints of a failing economic system began to 
change the thinking of the Soviet Union in terms of guaranteeing security by seeking an 
improved international security environment: 
“Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, in other words, 
on the doctrines of ‘containment’ or ‘deterrence.’ . . . In the context of the 
relations between the USSR and the USA, security can only be mutual . . . 
The highest wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to 
the detriment of the other side.  It is vital that all should feel equally secure 
. . . In the military sphere we intend to act in such a ways to give nobody 
grounds for fear, even imagined ones, about their security.”52 
                                                 
50 Avis Bohlen et al., “The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces,” 9. 
51 Ibid., 10. 
52 Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely,” 200-201. 
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For the United States and President Reagan the goal was to break from the previous 
negotiation schemes of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter – which focused on delivery 
vehicles – and focus on limiting “the actual weapons, the warheads, ‘which are what kill 
people.’”53  
Once negotiations restarted in early 1985 the Soviet planned goal was to 
link progress in the areas of INF to progress in other areas like START, BMD and other 
space issues.  However, by October of ’85 Gorbachev began to voice that the Soviet 
Union might be able to accept the INF as a separate agreement that was delinked from the 
other negotiations.  Included in delinking BMD and START was the removal of British 
and French nuclear systems from “the ledger.”54   
It would not be until the Reagan-Gorbachev summit of October 1986 in 
Reykjavik that real progress towards the total elimination of INF systems began to take 
shape.  Up to this point the Soviets had maintained that an equal limit between the United 
States and Soviet Union should be maintained, but at ever decreasing numbers.  By late 
1986 the Soviets proposed that “the United States and Soviet Union eliminate all of their 
INF missile systems in Europe.”55 While this did not include the Asian based systems it 
was a drastic move toward the initial Reagan proposed treaty of “zero-zero.”  By 1987 
the deal was all but concluded with both sides agreeing to the zero-zero proposal of the 
United States all that was left to negotiate was how the intrusive inspection regime would 
be framed.  Negotiators would continue to work on the inspection guidelines up until the 
eleventh hour before President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were to sign the 
final INF treaty on 8 December, 1987.56 
C. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Soviet policy transition in the 1980’s has been a hotly debated topic since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Several theories have risen from the ashes of the 
                                                 
53 Schenck and Youmans, “From Start to Finish,”425.  
54 Avis Bohlen et al., “The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces,” 10-11. 
55 Ibid.. 
56 Ibid., 11-12 
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Soviet Union with each of the major ideologies weighing in on what the causal factors 
might have been for such a drastic changing in Soviet foreign policy.  Two examples 
include: the realist idea, as put forth by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, that it 
was material factors that lead to the Soviet policy changes; and a liberal/constructivist 
view as presented by Thomas Risse-Kappen, that it was the social interactions of the 
Soviet elite and the institutions they attended that brought about the change in thinking 
along with domestic structures that ultimately led to the turnaround in Soviet elite foreign 
policy thinking.  Utilizing the research conducted by Brooks/Wohlforth and Risse-
Kappen and by taking a realist/constructivist view I propose that it was a mix of the two, 
that it was the material factors that led the Soviet elite to turn to the states intellectual 
entrepreneurs and the international institutions they were a part of to find the solutions 
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First a look at the material factors that led the Soviet elite to determine that the 
policy of retrenchment as put forward and enacted by Gorbachev.  Second, I will look at 
the role that international institutions and the social interactions of the Soviet elites within 
those institutions played in creating the ideas that ultimately shaped the Soviet Union’s 
foreign policy.  Finally, I will analyze some counterarguments and by defending against 
them prove that in the end the material factors and social interactions in the international 
institutional arena were the causal mechanism that resulted in the foreign policy change 
of the Soviet Union.  
a. The Material Decline of the Soviet Union 
The perception and in fact reality of a material deficiency between the 
Soviet Union and the United States is the underlying factor that caused the Soviet Union 
to reconsider its status.  As Brooks and Wohlforth show, the Soviet Union was in a 
systemic decline that could not be attributed to the normal cycle and the ability to 
maintain the status quo could no longer be sustained.  According to both Soviet and CIA 
estimates the Soviet decline economically began as far back as the 1960’s.  By the 1970’s 
the decline in Soviet economic capabilities took and even greater toll on the economy as 
rates of return on investment declined, the number of patents that were approved to 
Soviet scientist also declined, even in the face of increased expenditures for R&D by the 
state, and the Soviet Union became the “first industrialized country to register peacetime 
declines in life expectancy and infant mortality.”57 By the 1980’s the Soviet’s had 
reached the point of no return in terms of economic capability and that the gap in both 
economic terms and technological terms could never be overcome.58 
From a fiscal perspective the Soviet Union dedicated massive amounts of 
resources to their military apparatus and maintaining the status quo.  Estimates show that 
the Soviet Union dedicated 40 percent of its budget, or 15-20 percent of GDP towards 
defense.  These numbers were almost 4 times higher than that of the United States during 
the same time period, early 1980’s.  What is also staggering is that because of their 
                                                 
57 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War” 18. 
58 Ibid., 19. 
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“imperial overstretch,” the amount they were spending was increasing as costs in 
maintaining its empire doubled between 1972 and 1982.  Part of that overstretch can be 
seen with the imposing of martial law in Poland in 1981, as a result huge subsidized loans 
were granted to the states of Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany.59  
Faced with these economic and technological problems and using the 
realist framework there are three options that a state can take when faced with imminent 
decline within the bi-polar system: go to war in order to reverse the decline, do nothing 
and continue to maintain the status quo, or appease the dominant power and foster a 
policy of retrenchment in order to revitalize domestic production and reverse your 
decline.  In response to the first two options, going to war with the United States and its 
western allies would not have been an option because of nuclear deterrence.  Maintaining 
the status quo was impossible because of the rapid decline of the Soviet economy coupled 
with the increased spending on defense.  The fact that the status quo could not be 
maintained was emphasized by Gorbachev when he stated in a Politburo session that “our 
goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race.  If we do not accomplish it, the threat 
to us will only grow.  We will be pulled into another round of the arms race that is 
beyond our capabilities . . . because we are already at the limit of our capabilities.”60 This 
statement by Gorbachev along with the material factors, and as we will see during the 
intellectual entrepreneur and idea formation process, appeasement was the Soviet 
Union’s best option.61   
b. Intellectual Entrepreneurs, Social Interactions and International 
Institutions 
As was previously shown the economic and fiscal problems that were 
facing the Soviet Union were of a systemic rather than a cyclical nature.  As a result 
pressures on the Soviet foreign policy stance began to mount.  As a result, new ideas of 
foreign policy needed to be formed in order to combat the perceived and real gap 
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between the Soviet Union and its rival the United States.  With the reality of the gap 
beginning to set in, Gorbachev turned to the more radical intellectual entrepreneurs to 
find new ideas as he embarked on a public campaign to change the old way of thinking 
policy practices and what the Soviet Union’s international role would be in the future.  
The question then is where were these new intellectual entrepreneurs gaining their 
insight?  How were they able to pass their new ideas onto the Soviet elite?   
By looking at the research done by Risse-Kappen we can begin to put 
answers to the previous two questions.  We will look first at some of the Soviet 
intellectual entrepreneurs that had close ties to both Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze and how they utilized two key Soviet organizations that were 
involved in transnational institutes for change: the United States of America and Canada 
Institute (ISKAN) run by Georgii Arbatov and his deputy Andrei Kokoshins; also, we 
will look at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) 
and its efforts to create a change in Soviet foreign policy.62   
ISKAN would become a crucial link between the international community 
and Gorbachev’s inner circle.  As director of ISKAN Georgii Arbatov was involved in 
the Palme commission or the Independent Commission for Disarmament and Security, 
but he also held a key position in the Gorbachev cabinet giving him a unique opportunity 
to directly influence Gorbachev’s thinking on foreign policy and Soviet security issues.63  
What the Palme commission offered would be instrumental in shaping east west relations 
by introducing the concept of common security.64  With the advent of the atomic and 
hydrogen bombs the idea that a full scale war could be won by either side had lived out 
its time and that in the new world order a common security for all needed to be 
established in both the east and the west.  The commission provided the framework for 
how to “define the principles of a cooperative East-West security regime and spelled 
them out with regard to arms control, confidence-building measures and economic 
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cooperation.”65  According to Arbatov the Palme commission was very significant in 
changing the political thinking within the Soviet Union.66 
To a lesser extent the impact that the IMEMO had on changing Soviet 
thinking was through aides to Gorbachev and not through direct access such as with 
ISKAN.  As the new head of the Department of Disarmament and International security, 
Alexei Arbatov a radical “New Thinker” and son of ISKAN director Arbatov, helped to 
foster new ideas and thinking.67  The IMEMO was able to forward its ideas for change, 
especially in changing the idea that America’s capitalism was an enemy, through two key 
advisors in the Gorbachev inner circle, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Tevgeniy Primakov.  
The IMEMO proposal also worked to show that through interdependence the goals of 
both the Soviet Union and the United States could be met.68   
IMEMO and ISKAN provided the mechanism for transferring new ideas 
to the Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs.  These intellectual entrepreneurs then in turn 
aided General Secretary Gorbachev in creating the ideas of glasnost and the new 
approach of a non-confrontational stance towards the west.  According to Donaldson and 
Nogee, the ‘new thinking’ in Soviet “foreign policy proceeded from the premise of the 
‘interdependence of states and peoples.  In an interdependent world, Gorbachev reasoned, 
national security could not be based on the use or threat of nuclear power.  Rather, 
security for the superpowers must be mutual, and must be ensured by political means.”69  
The new Soviet policy of an interdependent world along with Gorbachev and Reagan’s 
desires to limit nuclear weapons, if not eliminate them entirely, directly led to the 
agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in February 1987.  The agreement was to 
eliminate a dangerous threat to the security of Europe, the entire class of intermediate 
nuclear forces.70  
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 INF, having been in negotiation since late 1981, allowed Gorbachev to 
make the greatest strides toward creating a non-confrontational stance towards the west.  
Gorbachev was able to use what Matthew Evangelista calls the strong normative 
commitment to nuclear disarmament within the soviet elite to his advantage in ultimately 
achieving the treaty.  However, there is the possibility that it was the proposed 
deployment of the Pershing II and GLCMs to Europe that led the elite to support the INF, 
a purely realist perspective.  According to Bohlen et al, the Soviet elite determined that 
the sacrifice of their INF was more palatable than the full deployment of US Pershing II 
and GLCM’s.  The potential fear was that the new Pershing II’s would be capable of 
reaching Moscow and “thus could threaten a quick, decapitating nuclear strike.”71 
Another argument can be made that the large standing army of the Soviet Union in the 
late 1980’s allowed for Gorbachev to push for the reduction in INF; however in 1988 
Gorbachev announced unilateral troop reductions and shortly after accepted the Western 
proposal to establish a conventional parity in Central Europe during the Conventional 
Forces in Europe negotiations.  Ultimately, due to material factors, the reorientation of 
Soviet policy was influenced by the transnational interactions that international 
institutions provided.  By having access to the inner circle, either directly or indirectly, 
the result that the institutchiks achieved was a major policy shift towards the west by 
providing a rationalized argument for the need to make a dramatic change.72 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Nuclear arms reductions and arms control are the cooperative foundation on 
which relations between the United States and the Russian Federation is built.  Starting in 
the 1960’s and culminating in the signing of the INF treaty in 1987, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation have continued to build their 
relationship on this foundation concluding such arms control treaties as START I and II, 
SORT, and new START.  These treaties have significantly reduced the number of nuclear 
weapons that the two largest holders of these destructive weapons currently hold.  Under 
                                                 
71 Bohlen et al, “The Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces,” 17. 
72 Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely,” 203. 
 30 
new START the number of deployable strategic nuclear warheads was reduced to 1,550 
and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 700, with the goal of seven years from inception 
to reach the new levels.  The reductions are 75 percent lower than the original START 
treaty and nearly 30 percent lower than those negotiated in SORT.73 
This has all been achieved thanks to the INF treaty.  While there were many 
treaties that sought to limit the arms race and control the spread of the nuclear weapons, 
i.e. NPT and PTBT.  However, it was not until the INF that real strides could be made in 
the true reduction of nuclear weapons.  For the Soviet Union the road to the INF 
negotiations began in the 1960’s as the Soviet economy began its steady decline towards 
total collapse.  It is the material factors of a declining economy that led the Soviet elite to 
turn toward transnational institutions such as the Palme commission, ISKAN, and 
IMEMO in order to find new ideas for correcting the material deficiencies of the Soviet 
Union.  What resulted was the Soviet ‘new thinking’ that allowed Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev to achieve his goals of reforming the Soviet foreign policy from an atagonistic 
approach toward the West to one of interdependence.74 
In the world of nuclear superpowers, Gorbachev argued for mutual, political 
advancements in the relationship between the East and West in order to achieve and 
maintain international security.  For INF this meant the concession to the West’s call for 
the ‘zero-zero’ by the Soviets.  Reagan’s ‘zero-zero’ called for the complete removal of 
the entire class of intermediate nuclear forces from the Soviet and American inventories.  
Some have argued that the response by the Soviets was based on realist factors as the 
United States was beginning its deployment of the new Pershing II nuclear tipped 
missiles into Europe as part of its two pronged approach to INF negotiations.  The 
Soviets believed that the concession on INF to ‘zero-zero’ was a better option than the 
possibility of continued Pershing II deployments to NATO.  It also achieved Gorbachev’s 
‘new thinking’ goal of nuclear arms reductions. 
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To conclude, the INF was the stepping stone that established intrusive inspection 
regimes and began the push by both the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Federation to 
conclude drastic nuclear arms reduction treaties with the United States.  The road to these 
historic treaties begins with the material problems of the Soviet Union.  As the elite 
looked for solutions, they turned to transnational organizations and institutions in order to 
seek new ideas for reform.  The elite intellectual entrepreneurs then influenced the 
primary foreign policy maker, Gorbachev, or where foreign policy makers themselves, 
Shevardnadze, to make dramatic foreign policy changes that led to Soviet ‘new thinking’ 
culminating in a conciliatory stance in achieving INF. 
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III. THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND THE BMD DEBATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The attacks on the World Trade Center towers by Islamic terrorists in September 
2001 altered fundamentally the status of global international relations.  The new threat 
brought on by the attacks led to new areas of cooperation between the United States and 
its former adversary, the Russian Federation.  However, when President George W. Bush 
unilaterally announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty in December of 2001 the trust fostered following the 
September 2001 attacks disappeared, and created an acrimonious environment between 
Washington and Moscow.  Furthermore, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002 
has placed the cooperative relationship between the United States and Russia with 
regards to European security in jeopardy. 
In the previous chapter I showed how material deficiencies forced the Soviet 
intellectual entrepreneurs to turn to international organizations in order to construct new 
ideas for Soviet foreign policy that led to cooperation and the ultimate signing of the INF 
treaty.  In this chapter I utilize the same method in order to look at how the material 
factors have led the new cadre of elite controlling the Kremlin to turn to their intellectual 
entrepreneurs to create new ideas to cope with the material decline of the Russian armed 
forces.  The difference between the two chapters is that the influence on the intellectual 
entrepreneurs of the Soviet era is vastly different than the influences on the ruling elite of 
today’s Russian Federation.   I argue that the ruling elite and intellectual entrepreneurs 
inhabiting the Kremlin today are influenced by their socialization in and association with 
the security services of the former Soviet Union and post-Cold War Russian Federation.  
That socialization has led them to perceive any move by the United States as a direct 
threat on the security of Russia.  For the United States as, arguably, the global hegemon 
in terms of material capability and wealth the incentive to cooperate is low since it can 
use its material power to exploit others to achieve its security goals. 
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In the first of three sections, I conduct a brief look at the current BMD capabilities 
of the Russian Federation and the United States.  The second section provides a brief 
outline of the ABM treaty followed by a discussion of the Russian perspective on the 
United States unilateral withdrawal from the treaty and decision to deploy the ballistic 
missile defense system to Europe. In the final section of this chapter I show how material 
deficiencies have led the Siloviki, who rely on their socialization in the KGB and FSB, to 
determine how the Russian Federation will react to the United States PAA to missile 
defense of the European continent.  In this penultimate section of the chapter I focus on 
who the Siloviki are, what they want, and how their views affect U.S.-Russian relations. 
B. CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 
1. Current Russian Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities 
The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty caused a stir 
in the political and military circles of Russia.  The Kremlin was forced to reconsider the 
issue of establishing an air-space defense (ASD) system within Russia.  In 2006 Russian 
President Vladimir Putin approved “The Concept of Air-Space Defense of the Russian 
Federation to 2016 and the Following Period.”75 According to General of the Army and 
president of the Academy of Military Sciences Makhmut Gareev the reasons for the 
creation of a national ASD system is due to the nature of modern warfare:  
Given the current nature of warfare, its center of gravity and main efforts 
are shifting to air-space.  The leading countries of the world put the main 
emphasis on achieving superiority in air and space by conducting large-
scale air-space operation with massive strikes against strategic and vitally 
important targets all over the country at the very beginning of a war.  In 
these circumstances, instead of recreating a separate branch of the Armed 
Forces, it is necessary to approach the mission of air-space defense by 
consolidating the efforts of all services of the Armed Forces and centralize 
their management under the leadership of the Supreme Commander and 
the General Staff of the Armed Forces.76  
                                                 
75 Viktor Esin, “Russia’s Air-Space Force and Armaments Program,” in Missile Defense: 
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According to Vikor Esin the ASD Force consists of: the Plesetsk State Testing 
Cosmodrome in Mirny, Arkangelsk Oblast; The Titov Main Test and Space Systems 
Control Center in Krasnoznamensk, Moscow Oblast; The Main Center for Missile Attack 
Warning in Solnechnorosrsk, Moscow Oblast; The Main Space Surveillance Control 
Center in Noginsk-9, Moscow Oblast; The 9
th
 Missile Defense Division in Sofrino-1, 
Moscow Oblast; three air-space defense brigades; Scientific Experimental Station no. 45 
at the Kura Test Range , Kamchatka Krai; The Office for the introduction of new systems 
and facilities in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast; Logistic, security and supply units; The 
Alexander Mozhaisk Military Space Academy in St. Petersburg with branches in 
Pushkin, Kubinka, and Cherepovets; finally, the Military Space Cadet Corps in St. 
Petersburg.77  The Russian military scientists view the role of the above forces as “set of 
country-wide and military activities, operations, and actions by combat troops . . . to 
provide timely warning of an imminent air-space attack by an adversary, counter such an 
attack and defend vital sites, military force concentrations, and the population.”78 To 
accomplish its role, the ASD force now controls Russia’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
System (SPRN), the space monitoring system, the A-135 strategic area BMD, and 
surface-to-air systems.79 
Russia’s early warning radar system, the SPRN, is analogous to the U.S. Ballistic 
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) consisting of two echelons: a space echelon 
and a ground based echelon.  The space echelon is used to detect ballistic missile 
launches, while the ground-based echelon receives initial launch data from the space 
echelon to begin continuous tracking of the outbound missile in order to determine 
estimated impact site.  SPRN ground-based radar systems, or radio-technical nodes 
(ORTU), are located in several locations within the Russian Federation.  Three other 
ORTU nodes that were deployed in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, and two nodes 
that were located in Ukraine have since been discontinued from service.  Each node 
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utilizes one of four types of radar – Dnepr-M, Daryal, Volga, or Voronezh-M – able to 
detect exoatmospheric targets at ranges of 4,000 to 6,000 km.80  
As stated the A-135 strategic area BMD system was only limitedly deployed – 
within a 150 km radius of Moscow.  The system is equipped with a command and control 
center, two sectoral Dunay-3 type radars, multi-function Don-2n radar for preliminary 
target designation for missile tracking and intercept, and the 53T6 Gazelle short-range 
interceptor missile.81 The Gazelle interceptors are deployed at five sites: Lytkarino (16), 
Sofrino (12), Korolev (12) Skhodnya (16), and Vnukovo (12). 82 
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Station Radar Range Altitudes Elevations Azimuths Inclinations 
Olenegorsk Dnepr 250-4600 100-3400 5.5-34.5 280-340 60-72 
Pechora Daryal 300-7200 100-6600 2-55 305-55 73.5-84.3 
Mishelevka Dnepr 250-4600 100-3400 5.5-34.5 41-219 46.9-52.9 
  Voronezh-VP     2-70 70-110   
Lekhtusi Voronezh-M 100-4200 150-4000 2-70 245-355 53-127 
Armavir Voronezh-DM 100-4200 150-4000 2-60 165-295 34.5-145.5 
Armavir Voronezh-DM 100-4200 150-4000 2-60 55-185   
Kaliningrad Voronezh-DM 100-4200 150-4000 2-60 
187.5-
292.5   
Eniseysk 
     
  
Barnaul Voronezh-DM           
Balkhash Dnepr 385-4600 100-3400 5.5-34.5 91-151 41.4-26.8 
Gabala Daryal 300-7200 100-6600 2-55 115-205 30-150 
Baranovichi Volga 300-6500 100-4320 3-80 190-310 43.6-136.4 
Pushkino Don-2N 120-3700 100-3000 1-90 0-360 45-135 
Chekhov  Dunay-3U 300-4500 50-3900 1-49 257-305 52.9-51.1 
Table 1.   Current Russian Early Warning Radar Sites and Capabilities83 
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2. Current United States Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities 
Upon taking office in 2008, President Barack Obama directed a comprehensive 
review of the U.S. missile defense plan.  The ten month study resulted in a new approach 
to missile defense in Europe, the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA).84  The PAA 
provided new threat assessments as well as a plan to exploit new technologies and 
capabilities.  The original PAA would be implemented over four phases, starting with 
implementation of Phase 1 in 2011 and ending with Phase 4 implementation in 2020.85 
Current United States BMD capabilities provide a very limited form of protection 
from ICBM threats.  The current system to protect the continental United States relies on 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD).  In 2010 it was projected that by the end of 
the FY a total of 30 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) would be deployed, 26 interceptors 
at Fort Greely in Alaska and 4 at Vandenberg in California.86  This number was updated 
in a statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on March 15, 2013 to a total of 44 
GBI’s, adding an additional 14 interceptors to the Fort Greely site.87 
Regional capabilities have also progressed with the development of increased 
capabilities of the shore based PATRIOT (PAC-3) batteries and the new Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries.  Sea based systems have also developed with 
advancements in the Aegis combat suite and development of the advanced capability SM-
3 Block IA-IIB missile systems.  Each system can be fully integrated and receive launch 
data from sea and space assets.88 
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Phase one detailed the deployment of current missile technologies with a proven 
track record.  The systems included the Sea-based Aegis Weapons system and its SM-3 
Block IA missile, and sensors such as the AN/TPY-2 Army-Navy Transportable Radar 
Surveillance system.  Phase two is to be implemented by 2015 following further 
development and testing of a more capable SM-3 interceptor for both land and sea based 
systems and improved sensor systems, allowing for an expansion of defended areas 
against short- and medium-range missile threats.  Phase three further builds on current 
technology advancements to deploy the SM-3 Block IIA to counter short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range missile threats by 2018.  Phase four was scheduled to be implemented 
by 2020, and would have deployed the SM-3 Block IIB missile system that would have 
been capable of intercepting medium- and intermediate-range missiles with the potential 
for future engagement of ICBM threats to the United States, but has since been canceled 
by the United States.89 
C. THE 1972 ABM TREATY AND THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE 
In 2002, when President Bush withdrew the United States from the ABM Treaty 
Russia warned “that the loss of the treaty would undermine the nuclear strategic stability 
on which the delicate balance of terror had rested during the Cold War,” claiming that a 
world without the ABM treaty would jeopardize the other standing arms control 
agreements – START I and II, INF, and even the NPT.90  According to Celeste 
Wallander, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the backbone of strategic stability 
and is the foundation on which the array of arms reduction and nuclear non-proliferation 
treaties has been built.  In the view of Moscow and its former Foreign Minister, Igor 
Ivanov, if the ABM is thrown aside then the “interconnected system will collapse, 
nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.”91 What exactly is the ABM 
Treaty and why was it perceived as so important by the Russian Federation? Is it the 
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foundation for the “interconnected system” of arms reduction and nuclear non-
proliferation treaties as Igor Ivanov claims?  What factors are persistent in the BMD 
debate that is causing the United States and Russia to not cooperate?   
1. 1972 ABM Treaty 
In 1972 the United States and the USSR signed into force the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation 
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.  Signed on May 26, 1972 in Moscow by General 
Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and Ratified by the President of the 
United States Richard Nixon on September 23, 1972 the treaty entered into force on 
October 3, 1972.  Article XIV of the treaty called for review five years after 
implementation and then at five year intervals thereafter.  The ABM treaty allowed for 
each party to have two ABM defense positions “so restricted and so located that they 
cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one.”92  
The locations of the two defended sites had to be at least 1,300 kilometers apart with no 
more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers.  The parties agreed that one of the 
two sites could defend its capital while the other could be placed to defend an ICBM 
launch site.  In addition to the limitation on the number of launch sites, interceptors and 
launchers, the treaty stipulated that each party would limit any qualitative improvement 
to their ABM systems.  This included a ban on the development, testing, or deployment 
of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems.93   
2. The Russian Perspective 
The stated reason for the United States National Missile Defense (NMD) system 
is that the “United States is threatened by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
and missile technology by certain ‘states of concern’.”94  In the view of the Russians this 
is an unrealistic fear.  According to Russian analysts the threat from North Korea is ten 
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years away and the threat from Iran is twenty to twenty-five years away - keep in mind 
that this article was written in 2000 and as recently as early 2013 N. Korea successfully 
detonated a nuclear device and continues to advance its missile capabilities working on 
the Taepadong-2 missile with a range of 5000 to 6000 km.
95
 
Russia believes that the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense 
systems in former Warsaw Pact states undermines global stability.  Also, ABM defensive 
systems could be a future counter to the Russian ICBM portion of their nuclear 
deterrence triad.
96
  According to Wallander, the disagreement to the United States 
withdrawal from the ABM is complicated and requires an understanding of Russia’s 
national security issues, status of its military, foreign policy doctrine, capabilities of 
Russian conventional and nuclear forces, and the role that nuclear weapons play in 
Russia’s defense posture.97  To support her assessment, Wallander provides examples of 
how Russia perceives threats to its national security.  They include the enlargement of 
NATO, which in the eyes of the Russian Federation has increased the alliances 
conventional capability while Russia’s conventional forces have been on a steady decline 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Russian analysts have concluded that “Russia’s 
conventional forces are insufficient to defeat external aggression and internal conflicts.”98 
As a result of the decline in their conventional forces’ capabilities to defend the 
homeland, Russia has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed 
conflict.   
Wallander further argues that with a limited U.S. NMD system deployed in 
Europe and in the United States then the calculations for the Russian retaliatory 
capability must be changed.  If the U.S. develops a robust NMD system then the Russians 
have stated that they would consider arming the Topol-M missile with a multiple 
                                                 
95 Ibid.. 
96 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Carnegie Endowment, February 5, 2010, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf; Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation,” NATO Research Review: NATO Defense College, February 2010, 1, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=170. 
97 Wallander, “Russia’s New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Debate,” 339.  
98 Ibid., 340. 
 42 
warhead system.99 By creating a multiple warhead capable rocket, the Russians believe 
they will be able to counter the defensive capability of the U.S./NATO ABM system.  
Also of concern is that if the United States deploys an NMD system what will the 
Chinese response be?  Russia assumes that with a U.S. NMD system deployed the 
Chinese will respond with an increase in deployment of missiles to counter the new 
American defense capability.  Russia will then respond with an increase in their number 
of deployed warheads in order to maintain a credible deterrence.
100
  Dmitri Trenin sums 
the Russian stance up well stating that the Russian elite “focus on states’ military 
capabilities, rather than their political affiliations.  Essentially this means that any country 
with a substantial military potential – whether an advanced Western democracy, an 
emerging Asian power, or a restive Middle Eastern regime – can become a threat to 
Russia.”101 
The Kremlin has put forward two counter-proposals of its own to support a 
Europe wide missile defense system.  The first was proposed on June 7, 2007, during the 
G-8 meeting in Germany, when President Vladimir Putin offered to partner with the 
United States on missile defense.  The Putin proposal suggested that the Soviet-era radar 
facility in Azerbaijan was an ideal location to track and target hostile missile launched 
from the Middle East.  Putin also suggested a week later that the Bush proposed location 
of interceptors in Poland was not ideal and that “GMD interceptors be ‘placed in the 
south, in U.S. NATO allies such as Turkey, or even Iraq . . . or on sea platforms.’”102 In 
July 2007, Putin also suggested that missile defense be coordinated through the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC).  By using the NRC it would allow for the cooperation on missile 
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defense to be expanded to other European counties and away from the Czech Republic 
and Poland – a point of contention for the Russians.  Cooperation through the NRC 
would allow for the use of a radar facility in southern Russia for early warning and 
tracking.103 
In November 2010 Russian President Dmitri Medvedev proposed a sector-based 
missile defense system.  In cooperation with the United States and NATO the sector-
based system would establish a system where every country would be responsible for a 
particular sector.104 Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin described the 
system “as ‘two knights standing back to back,’ each fighting off dangers that appeared 
in his own geographical sphere of responsibility.”105 Jeffery Mankoff further described 
the system as a highly integrated system, to include “highly sensitive command and 
control functions and fire control.”106 Due to the sectorial nature of the system, NATO 
and Russian sectors would need to overlap, requiring that Russia be responsible for the 
defense of NATO territories and vice-a-versa.107 
D. FACTORS OF NON-COOPERATION AND THE THEORETICAL 
INROADS 
In the previous chapter I discussed the factors of cooperation that led to the 
eventual signing of the INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Utilizing the factors that led to cooperation on INF – realist material decline and 
constructivist intellectual entrepreneurship – I propose that these theories can be utilized 
in analyzing the current relationship between the United States and Russia.  Many of the 
material factors have been discussed in the previous section of this chapter will be further 
analyzed here.  The second part of the section will focus on the current cadre of 
intellectual entrepreneurs that have the ear of President Putin and how their cold war 
                                                 
103 Ibid.. 
104 Tsypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” 56. 
105 “Rogozin urges missile agreements with NATO,” Voice of Russia, November 22, 2010, accessed 
March 20, 2013, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/11/22/35414738.html. 
106 Jeffery Mankoff, “The Politics of US Missile Defence Cooperation with Europe and Russia,” 
International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 341. 
107 Ibid.; Tsypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” 55. 
 44 
thinking and their secret service and military backgrounds have perpetuated an anti-west 
attitude that is reflected in Russia’s non-cooperation on missile defense. 
1. Material factors 
“Let us be realists – in the near future Russia hardly will succeed in 
catching up with and overtaking the leading powers in terms of 
technological level of development.  Our economy is ten times less than 
the American economy and Russia’s scientific potential essentially was 
demolished after the USSR’s disintegration.  Today the lag behind leading 
Western counties in a number of critical basic technologies is dozens of 
years.”108 
As Dimitry Rogozin, Russia’s Vice Prime Minister and Military-Industrial 
commission Chairman, indicates in the quote above, the material status of the Russian 
Federation is still lagging behind the rest of the industrialized powers.  To add further 
insult to injury Russia’s conventional forces have been on a steady decline since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  Russian analysts have concluded that “Russia’s 
conventional forces are insufficient to defeat external aggression and internal 
conflicts.”109 As a result of the decline in their conventional forces’ capabilities the 
Russian Federation has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed 
conflict; therefore, Russia will rely on its nuclear arsenal for its defense, escalation 
control, and deterrence policies.
110
 
What are the current shortfalls of the Russian military, and what steps is the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) taking to return the military to its past glory? The answer 
lies in two events in recent history that help to explain the current conventional 
capabilities of the Russian Federation: The Russo-Georgian War and the large-scale 
military exercise that were conducted in the Russian Far East military district in February 
2013.  
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In 2008 the Russian army invaded Georgia, one of the former Soviet republics, it 
touched off a series of events that showed that despite the lofty prestige that was once 
afforded to the largest standing army in the world, that prestige has since been lost.  
According to Roger McDermott a “[a] recognizable pattern emerged which focused on 
aged vehicles, hardware, and weaponry; ineffective command and control organizations 
and systems; lack of interservice coordination; failures of intelligence support and the 
GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation 
Satellite System).”111 Based on his review of events in Georgia, Vladimir Shamanov, 
Chief of the Main Combat Training and Service Directorate, determined that three key 
factors led to the dismal showing of the Russian military in Georgia: poor coordination 
between air support and ground troops, poor communications systems, including 
command and control functions, and a lack of high-resolution surveillance systems.112 
Further highlighting Russian conventional forces inadequacies were the findings 
of Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff.  In December of 2008 General Makarov 
addressed a meeting at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow 
emphasizing the immense operational and planning problems as well as the low levels of 
combat readiness during the Georgian campaign. Rodger McDermott suggests that “[I]n 
short, Makarov suggested that Russian forces were incapable of fighting a modern war 
and had to be radically reformed.”113  To add insult to injury “Eighty-three percent of 
Army units were numerically incomplete, and only 17 percent were combat ready. Of the 
150 regiments in the Air Force only five are permanently combat ready, while in the 
Navy ‘half the warships stand idle at anchor.’”114 
Since his return to the Presidency in 2012, President Putin has been skeptical of 
the advances by the MOD since the reform initiatives were implemented in late 2008 
early 2009.  In a move to test the capabilities of the Russian military a massive unplanned 
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exercise was ordered in the East Military District in February of 2013.  What resulted 
from the exercise further highlights the conventional woes of the Russian Federation.  
After more than 4 years of reform and rearmament the Russian military is still 
experiencing much of the same problems that it faced in 2008.  During the exercise 
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu complained that command and control communications 
were inadequate complaining that he was unable to receive information from aircraft and 
early warning systems.  It was assessed that command, control, and communications 
were only operating at 18 percent efficiency.115 Furthermore, only 17 percent of the 
military equipment was new in the East Military District.116 
Russia continues to cling to vestiges of its super power past to ensure a continuing 
role in the new world order.  According to Dmitri Trenin, Russian policy makers respect 
the laws of Realpolitik, believing that “all nations seek to expand their influence, and in 
order to do so they rely on their power.”117 The lack of major improvements to the 
capability and arming of the Russian military has President Putin asking questions of 
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who is also the head of the state-run Military 
Industrial Commission.  Current MOD statistics show that approximately 90 percent of 
items acquired from the defense industry are returned by military representatives during 
the test stage of development.  Furthermore, in 2012 “more than 20 percent of weapons 
and military equipment products were classified as ‘under-supplied.’ . . . [also] in the first 
six months of 2013, no more than between 15 percent to 20 percent of equipment 
scheduled for servicing was actually serviced.”118 
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Far East Military District exercises 
conducted earlier this year highlight the fact that the Russian military has fallen on hard 
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times and is a source of concern for the Kremlin.  The new members of NATO are 
backed and receiving political and military aid from the largest and most advanced 
economic power in the world, the United States, while the Russian military is dependent 
on a mismanaged, over optimistic, and corrupt military-industrial complex that is more 
concerned with expressing Cold War style rhetoric than in providing the Russian military 
with reliable, advanced, high-technology weapon systems.  However, despite Putin’s 
desire to increase funding of the military to regain some of the lost prestige, the current 
economic slowdown affecting the Russian economy has placed that funding in jeopardy.  
These material factors make the Russians hostile to any United States plans to install 
BMD systems in eastern or central Europe.119 
Furthermore, the Russian preoccupation and refusal to establish a cooperative 
environment with the United States on missile defense can be found in Russian culture 
and their preoccupation with strategic depth.  Russian strategic depth saved the Russian 
Empire from Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, and the new Soviet Union from invasion by 
the Germans in 1941.  Today Russians believe that the current planned American missile 
defense system threatens Russia’s retaliatory response potential therefore limiting its 
strategic depth.  The fall back option that existed for the Soviet Union in the 1960’s and 
70’s – “overwhelm any proposed US missile defense by deploying more and more 
nuclear delivery vehicles” – Russia believes this is no longer feasible due to the 
continued decline of the Russian military-industrial complex.120 The United States has 
repeatedly referred the Russians to the U.S. National Missile Defense Act of 1999 which 
states that the goal of the US BMD system is to defend the United States against a limited 
ballistic missile attack.  Furthermore, US officials have provided the Russian Ministry of 
Defense with the technical data that shows that neither the current proposed European 
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BMD shield, nor the SM-3 block IIB is a threat to Russian ICBM’s.121  The technical 
expertise of one of Russia’s own, Yury Solomonov, argues that there is no direct threat to 
the Russian strategic deterrence now or in the future from US BMD.  According to 
Solomonov, who is the chief designer of Russia’s newest ballistic missile, “In most cases, 
and I’m saying this absolutely officially and competently, [American BMD] is an 
absolutely far-fetched threat to our strategic potential.”122 
2. The Siloviki and the New Russian Intellectual Entrepreneurs 
During the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union embodied a conciliatory attitude 
toward the west.  In the face of mounting material deficiencies, it was Gorbachev’s 
stance, and that of his close advisors, that the Soviet Union needed to retrench its efforts 
by focusing on domestic issues.  In order to achieve this end, Gorbachev made drastic 
changes in both domestic policy but also in foreign and national security policy.  He 
opted for a less antagonistic stance towards the west, in order to relieve the material 
pressures of the arms race.  As I showed in the previous chapter, much of the policy 
changes can be attributed to the input Gorbachev was receiving from his closest advisors.  
In this section I argue that the same process is occurring in President Putin’s regime.  
Putin may not be the uncommitted thinker of Gorbachev, as Janice Gross Stein argues, 
who turned to Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs and international institutions to solve the 
material deficiencies of the Soviet Union, as Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen Brooks, and 
William Wohlforth argue.123 However, according to Yelena Tregubova – a reporter from 
the Kremlin press pool – called Putin an apparatchik who could work the system.  She 
described him as a person of “a quite average Soviet education, of an average intellect. . . 
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But he is very, very adaptable.  [A person who is] simply a brilliant ‘reflector,’ that, like a 
mirror he copied the person he was with, to compel them that he was just like them.”124 
Igor Malashenko recalls that “after three and a half hours of talking, I knew about Putin 
as little as I did before.  He was a shallow personality.”125 Yet Putin turned out to be a 
firm believer in an oft quoted bromide of the Soviet era, Joseph Stalin’s declaration that 
“the Cadres decide everything.”126 
  Since Putin came to power in 2000 he and his cadre of former security service 
personnel – the Siloviki – have come to dominate the Russian political landscape.  Who 
are the Siloviki?  What are their political beliefs and wants?  How have they impacted 
Russian foreign policy when it comes to Russian non-cooperation on missile defense? 
The broad answer to these questions is that Putin and his Siloviki seek to maintain 
Russian sovereignty, to maintain the image of being America’s equal in terms of being a 
nuclear superpower, to maintain a place in determining the future security of Europe, and 
to regain primary influence over its “near abroad.”127 
a. Putin and the Siloviki: Who They Are  
First, a definition of the term Siloviki: Siloviki is derived from the term 
silovye ministerstva – literal translation is “the ministries of force.”128  In Russia today 
the term Siloviki is interpreted as: “a group of current and former intelligence officer from 
Putin’s hometown of St. Petersburg who wield immense power within the Kremlin and 
control key sectors of the Russian Economy.”129 The Russian political landscape is 
littered with members of the Siloviki, in 2003 one in four of the Russian elite had a 
military or security background.  By 2006 the number of people with a security 
                                                 
124 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the end of Revolution 
(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 49. 
125 Ibid., 51. 
126 Ibid., 253. 
127 Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defense,” 792; Trenin, 
“Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” 44; Nichol, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U.S. Interests,” CRS, 26. 
128 Andrei Illarionov, “The Siloviki in Charge,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 2 (2009): 69. 
129 Ian Bremmer and Samual Charap, “The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They Are and What They 
Want,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006-07): 85, doi:10.1162/wash.2006-07.30.1.83 
 50 
background had reached 77 percent of Russia’s top 1,016 governmental positions. With 
control firmly in their hands, the Siloviki have also expanded out to gain control of key 
businesses and media outlets with few areas of Russian life that are not within the reach 
of this powerful brotherhood.130   
The Siloviki brotherhood is by no means a clan of equals.  According the 
Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap the Siloviki is arranged in a hierarchical system; it is 
best described as a series of concentric circle that emanates from the core and moves out 
to secondary and tertiary sub-groups.  These groups are roughly based on seniority, 
policy influence, and relative control over the nation’s resources and institutions. Those 
in the inner circle have the greatest influence over the president and each other through 
constant contact with one another.131  The core group includes: Igor Sechin, deputy head 
of the presidential administration; Viktor Ivanov, advisor to the president; and Nikolai 
Patrushev, director of the Federal Security Service (FSB).  The secondary circle includes 
Rosneft chief Sergey Bogdanchkov and Putin’s drug czar, Viktor Ivanov.  The tertiary 
circle is a fluid network of junior members who run smaller government agencies or are 
deputies of former core members.132 
b. What the Siloviki Want 
In recent years the world view of the Russian elite has been focused on the 
reality of their post-Cold War status and the nostalgia for the lost Soviet era.  Putin 
himself exemplified this thinking when he claimed that the Russian Federation was a 
victim of “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century.  In both foreign and 
domestic policies the Kremlin and the Siloviki have pushed to reduce the influence of the 
United States along the Russian periphery, especially when it comes to former Soviet 
States.133   
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While the Siloviki do not have a unified political philosophy they do share 
a set of core values.  First, they believe in the continued consolidation of political and 
economic power within a centralized state apparatus that is protected by a robust security 
and defense program.  For the Siloviki law, order, and stability are of a much higher 
priority than that of developing a robust civil society or democratically viable system.  
Second, the Siloviki are economic nationalists, seeking the restoration of Russia’s 
international greatness.  To achieve this end they believe in a strong state that should play 
a prominent role in the economic life of the state by nationalizing strategic sectors of the 
economy.  This includes the natural resources of the state.  In a throwback to Soviet days, 
the Siloviki hold to the idea that the natural resources of the nation belong to the people 
and that in the name of the people “the state should control every aspect of their 
exploitation.” Furthermore, domestic production should be protected from the forces of 
globalization. 134 
Next, the Siloviki continue to push for the restoration of Russian greatness 
and prestige on the international stage.  Despite the end of the Cold War, Russia still 
views the United States and NATO as an external threat that actively attempts to 
undermine Russian sovereignty.  For the Russian elite this is unacceptable and that the 
Russian Federation should garner the same respect that the former Soviet Union once 
commanded by continuing to maintain a strong army with state-of-the-art weapons 
systems.  Included in this sentiment is the insistence of some Siloviki that the former 
states of the Soviet Union be reintegrated into the Russian Federation.135 
c. The Siloviki and US-Russia Relations 
With the rise of the Siloviki to the elite positions in the Russian 
government, Putin has created a Soviet era political system with its own institutionalized 
hierarchy of power.  At the top is a select group of senior members, similar in style and 
power to that of the Soviet Politburo.136  The fact that the majority of the Siloviki come 
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from the security services binds them together based on a common set of training that 
separates them from the common civilian.137  During the Soviet era those that joined the 
secret service were in positions of privilege.  This is no different than what is occurring to 
day in Russian politics; the Silovkiki see themselves as an elite group.138  “Their training 
instills in them a feeling of being superior to the rest of populace, of being the rightful 
‘bosses’ of everyone else.”139 Having these ideas as a basis for analyzing the current 
relationship between the United States and Russia is key, because it provides a 
foundation on which to understand the actions of this group of former KGB and military 
members in Putin’s regime towards BMD. 
The Siloviki’s background in protecting the state and their Cold War 
mentality has carried over into their role as the dominant political force in Russia.  This 
group of former security members continues to see the United States as an adversary and 
through mirror imaging believe that the United States sees Russia as the enemy of old.  
The Silovkiki scrutinize each pronouncement by the United States on intelligence and 
national security matters for any anti-Russian bias.  This is also true when it comes to the 
deployment of United States missile defense systems in former Soviet satellite states 
against Russian wishes.140  For the Russian elite the American BMD deployment plans 
“serve as a reminder of Moscow’s weakness (as well as lack of technological capabilities 
to match American missile defences [sic]) in its own neighborhood.”141 The BMD 
deployment as such is thus deemed to be part of a “global plan” by the Americans to 
“achieve strategic superiority over Russia.”142 This attitude of hostility towards America 
when it comes to BMD in the Russian near abroad is a direct result of the Siloviki’s 
institutional background and training.  It can be argued that the Siloviki’s background in 
 
                                                 
137 Illarionov, “The Siloviki in Charge,” 69. 
138 Ibid., 70; James Rodgers, “Russian Ex-Spies Flex Their Muscles,” BBC, last modified September 
12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6989107.stm. 
139 Illarionov, “The Siloviki in Charge,” 70. 
140 Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defense,” 793. 
141 Ibid., 795. 
142 Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” 40. 
 53 
the security services has formed a permanent basis for their ideological orientation.  
Adding to this track of analysis is the fact that Putin himself is a product of that same 
training. 143  
The rise in power of the Siloviki and how they have come to influence 
Putin can thus be justified by understanding the process by which Putin came to power.  
Putin was thrust onto the Russian political scene at the very end of 1999 when President 
Yeltsin resigned making Vladimir Putin the acting president.  The sudden thrust into the 
presidency left Putin no choice but to rely on his cadre of trusted individuals who he had 
worked with in the past.  The post-Cold War era was representative of the political 
system in which the political regime was highly personalized as no institutionalized 
means of recruitment were available to Putin.  Also, his short term as Prime Minister left 
him no choice but to turn to individuals with security backgrounds, since they were the 
individuals he trusted and knew the most.144 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
According to Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin, the Russian strategic policy-makers 
have no specific ideology, but they do respect what they call the laws of Realpolitik.  
They believe that “all nations seek to expand their influence, and in order to do so they 
rely on their power, both hard and soft.”145 Furthermore, the relationship that the Russian 
Federation maintains with NATO and EU rests on the principle of equality between the 
one time adversaries.  This chapter analyzed the relationship between the United States 
and the Russian federation on the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense.  A relationship that 
Russia feels is moving towards the subordination of Russian interests to those of the 
West, and in particularly the interests of the United States.146 First it looked at the current 
BMD capabilities of the Russian Federation and the United States.  Second, I gave brief 
background of the ABM treaty as well as the Russian perspective on U.S. withdrawal 
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from the treaty in 2002.  Finally, I looked at both the material and political factors that 
have created an environment of non-cooperation between these two former adversaries. 
The ABM Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972 and entered into force on October 
3, 1972; however, according to the Bush administration the threats to the United States 
emanating from North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran required U.S. withdrawal 
from the treaties restrictions.  The stated reason for the withdrawal from the ABM treaty 
was that the governments in Pyongyang and Tehran were unpredictable, dangerous, and 
could not be contained by “traditional forms of military deterrence, diplomacy, or arms 
control.”147  As a result Condoleezza Rice, then Secretary of State, told reporters in 
December 2007, that she did not see anything in a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate 
that would alter the course of planned deployment of U.S. missile defense systems to 
Europe.  Originally proposed to roll out in four phases over the next decade, culminating 
in the deployment of advanced SM-3 missiles capable of intercepting a potential ICBM 
threat emanating from either North Korea or Iran, the fourth and final phase was cut in 
early 2013.  It was this potential to intercept ICBMs that had the Russian elite concerned 
and pushing for either a joint BMD system or for legal guarantees that U.S. BMD 
systems would not target Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence.148. 
Russian elite have a different view of the threats emanating from the Korean 
peninsula and the Middle East.  According to Russian analysts the threat from North 
Korea is ten years away and the threat from Iran is twenty to twenty-five years away.149 
What concerns the Russian Federation is the potential that the proposed U.S. European 
missile defense system could affect the nuclear deterrence of Russia.  Included with this 
concern is the deteriorating state of Russia’s conventional forces.  Dimitry Rogozin, 
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Military-Industrial commission Chairman, and member 
of the Siloviki, contends that, the material status of the Russian Federation is still lagging 
behind the rest of the industrialized powers.  Russia’s material deficiencies have steadily 
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declined since the end of the Cold War, as was evidenced in the 2008 invasion of 
Georgia, as well as the 2013 unannounced exercise conducted in Eastern Russia.  Russian 
analysts have come to the conclusion that the capabilities of the conventional Russian 
military are insufficient to defeat any external as well as any internal aggression.  It could 
be further argued that the performance of the Russian military during these two recent 
military events has led many in the Kremlin to reassess the conventional capability of 
Russian Forces and move toward implementing reform measures to correct the 
deficiencies.150  This has led the Kremlin to reassess its nuclear deterrent capability.  As a 
result, according to the 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Russian’s 
have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons by lowering the threshold for the use of 
nuclear forces in an armed conflict; therefore, Russia will rely on its nuclear arsenal for 
its defense, escalation control, and deterrence policies.
151
  
Material deficiencies have led Russian President Vladimir Putin, the “brilliant 
reflector,” to turn to his cadre of Siloviki to find solutions to the material deficiencies of 
the Russian military.152  The Siloviki, as has been argued above, have gained control over 
the foreign policy apparatus of the Russian Federation.  Their background in the security 
services makes the security of the state their number one priority.  According to Russian 
analysts like the late Dmitry Furman the Russia-West struggle for influence in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a struggle of two diametrically opposed 
systems.  The Russian system is a system that has a “compelling need for a foreign policy 
enemy that seeks not only to weaken Russia but to block its return to great power status, 
particularly in the CIS.”153 For the Russian elite the American BMD deployment plans 
“serve as a reminder of Moscow’s weakness (as well as lack of technological capabilities 
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to match American missile defences [sic]) in its own neighborhood.”154 The BMD 
deployment as such is thus deemed to be part of a “global plan” by the Americans to 
“achieve strategic superiority over Russia.”155 
My concluding argument, based on the evidence that has been presented in this 
chapter, is that both sides are reluctant to proactively discuss and come to an agreement 
on missile defense based on realist and constructivist principles.  For the United States, 
the threat emanating from North Korea and Iran pose a direct threat to U.S. national 
interests – protection of European allies and the homeland.  The Russians perceive this 
threat as unlikely in the near to long term.  What they do perceive is an attempt to 
minimize the strategic deterrence of the Russian Federation through the deployment of 
United States BMD systems to the European continent.  More importantly the Russian 
elite, the Siloviki, see it as a direct threat to the national prestige and security of the 
Russian Federation.  The Siloviki’s background in the security services of the Soviet 
Union and Russian Federation has instilled an inherent desire to maintain the security of 
the state above all other concerns.  Current Russian conventional forces capabilities make 
it more important than ever for Russia to rely on its nuclear deterrent capability for the 
security of the state.  The withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty and 
Obama’s PAA is perceived as a direct threat to that nuclear deterrent.   
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IV. CONCLUSION 
I finish where I started with Robert Jervis.  Jervis in his article “Cooperation 
under the Security Dilemma,” wrote that a state’s decision-makers will act based on the 
security vulnerabilities they feel.156 I analyzed two separate case studies to show how 
two different regimes faced with the same dilemma, the material decline of the state, 
produced two different outcomes.  In both cases I showed how the material decline of the 
state led intellectual entrepreneurs – based on their background, socialization, or 
association with different international organizations – to come up with different ideas on 
how to preserve the security of the state.   
In the first case study, Gorbachev and the Soviet Union chose to cooperate on INF 
and sacrifice its intermediate nuclear capability in order to achieve “the earliest and most 
direct impact on East-West relations” in order to reform the Soviet system.157 The case 
study of the INF treaty shows that material factors, as realist scholars contend, provided 
the impetus for the Soviet change in its foreign policy stance.  In the INF case study I 
argued that material factors provided the foundation on which the intellectual 
entrepreneurs looked to outside sources to solve the Soviet systemic decline.  These 
intellectual entrepreneurs then provided their policy-making superiors their conclusions 
based on the information that was garnered from social interactions with outside 
institutions.  In some cases, scholars argue that the policy-makers themselves were the 
intellectual entrepreneurs.158  I argued that organizations such as IMEMO and ISKAN 
provided the mechanism for transferring new ideas to Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs.  
These intellectual entrepreneurs then in turn aided General Secretary Gorbachev in 
creating the ideas of glasnost and the new approach of a non-confrontational stance 
towards the west. The new Soviet policy of an interdependent world along with 
Gorbachev and Reagan’s desires to limit nuclear weapons, if not eliminate them entirely, 
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directly led to the agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in February 1987.  The 
agreement was to eliminate a dangerous threat to the security of Europe, the entire class 
of intermediate nuclear forces.159 
In the second case study the material crisis of the Russian Federation led 
intellectual entrepreneurs to take a different path than that of its predecessors.  The 
Gorbachev era looked to open the gates to cooperation that led to a plethora of nuclear 
arms reduction regimes that have remained relevant till today.  However, a new cadre of 
intellectual entrepreneurs have now taken over the Kremlin who according to Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White number fewer ‘intellectuals’ with higher degrees, 
are from a more provincial background, and claim to have a military or security 
background.160  In her 2006 study Kryshtanovskaya found that 77 percent of the 1,016 
top Russian government positions were filled by people with a security background.161  
While they adapted to the new systems that evolved from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, their ideas and “metamorphosis of . . . views was typical of former officers during 
the reform years: an ambivalent consciousness shaped to accommodate both the newly 
established market and older ideas of state power and social justice.”162 These new 
adapted ideas are exemplified by author Stephen Blank: “Russia must be an independent 
sovereign actor, unbounded by any other political association and exercising unfettered 
power in its own domain,” and the concept of Derzhavnost, i.e. the idea that Russia is a 
unique, autocratic, and great power, a great power that must be acknowledged by other 
states that is granted a superior status, especially vis-a-vis the neighboring CIS.163   
Within in the material decline of the Russian Federation case study I used two 
additional case studies to emphasize the material decline of the Russian armed forces, the 
2008 invasion of Georgia and the short notice Eastern Military District exercise of early 
2013.  The Georgian invasion showed that aged vehicles, hardware, and weaponry; 
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ineffective command and control organizations and systems; and a lack of high-
resolution surveillance systems led to what Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff 
called immense operational and planning problems as well as low levels of combat 
readiness. Rodger McDermott suggests that “[I]n short, Makarov suggested that Russian 
forces were incapable of fighting a modern war and had to be radically reformed.”164 
Adding insult to injury 83 percent of Russian Army units were not fully manned, with 
only 17 percent ready for combat and the Russian Air Force had only five of its 150 
regiments combat ready.165 
The 2013 exercise was designed to test not only the Russian armed forces but the 
reforms that had been instituted 4 years earlier.  The results were not very promising.  
During the exercise Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu complained that command and 
control communications were inadequate complaining that he was unable to receive 
information from aircraft and early warning systems.  It was assessed that command, 
control, and communications were only operating at 18 percent efficiency.166 
Furthermore, only 17 percent of the military equipment was new in the East Military 
District.167  These two cases continue to show that the Russian Federation still is in the 
process of rebuilding its armed forces after years of neglect and corrupt leadership and is 
the overarching reason for the Russian elite to turn to intellectual entrepreneurs to find 
solutions for the material decline.   
Today’s Russian Federation intellectual entrepreneurs are exemplified by 
President Putin and his cadre of former KGB, FSB, and other security service officers, 
whose identity is characterized by a determination that “all nations seek to expand their 
influence, and in order to so they rely on their power.”168  Furthermore, the Russian elite 
believe in fostering an image of nuclear superpower equality between themselves and the 
United States.  Russia continues to seek a place in developing an all-inclusive European 
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security regime but sees the continued involvement of former satellites and Soviet 
Republics in European institutions as a threat to these aspirations and a direct assault on 
its national prestige.169 As a result of these ideals that were ingrained in the Siloviki it has 
created a system that has a “compelling need for a foreign policy enemy that seeks not 
only to weaken Russia but to block its return to great power status, particularly in the 
CIS.”170 For the Siloviki that enemy is the enemy that they trained to fight during the 
Cold War, the United States; therefore, any foreign policy move by the United States will 
be seen as a policy that is directed at Russia.171 
What I have shown here is that the Russian Federation at the systemic level is no 
longer the superpower of the Soviet Days.  Gorbachev recognized this and turned to his 
cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs, who were connected to international organization, to 
find solutions to these material deficiencies.  Putin has been faced with much the same 
sort of material decline since his rise to power in late 1999 and early 2000.  Where 
Gorbachev’s intellectual entrepreneurs were connected with international organizations, 
Putin’s cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs are cut from the same cloth as he is; his cadre 
is comprised of former KGB, FSB, and other security service individuals whose political 
socialization was created during the Soviet era when the United States and the West were 
still viewed as the existential enemy.  This has led Putin and his cadre of like-minded 
policy-makers to reconstruct the Soviet dogma of “enemies . . .  surround Russia from all 
directions, threatening invasions and sabotage.”172 By holding to this philosophy the 
Russian Federation is unwilling to bend and reach a compromise on American TBMD 
plans for Europe.  The United States is also not willing to compromise, as they continue 
to view the threat from North Korea and Iran as credible.   
Current events in the Middle East have sidelined the TBMD debate between the 
Moscow and Washington, as the United States contemplates either a diplomatic solution 
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or a military strike on Syria.  However, it could be argued that should the United States 
become involved militarily in Syria it may create an environment in Iran where military 
hard-liners dominate the current open minded stance of the new Iranian government.  
According to Geneive Abdo it will “empower Iran's hardliners at a rare time when the US 
could engage more moderate leaders on a host of issues from Syria to Iran's problematic 
nuclear programme. And it might marginalize Rouhani and the technocrats in his new 
cabinet, who are aptly being called part of a "modern right" faction, for the foreseeable 
future.”173 This in turn could give Iran further incentive to continue its alleged research 
and development of nuclear weapons grade material a development that might further 
destabilize Middle East security.174 
The BMD debate is by no means the only area that the formulation of factors that 
has been argued above can be applied to.  The current source of conflict between the 
United States and the Russian Federation on the enlargement of NATO is another area 
that can be looked at to continue further research in the area of U.S.-Russian relations.  
Many of the same arguments could be made in terms of material deficiencies of the 
Russian armed forces as well as the KGB socialization of the Siloviki in terms of the 
threat of an enlarging NATO. 
The Siloviki, as has been argued above, have gained control over the foreign 
policy apparatus of the Russian Federation.  Their background in the security services 
makes the security of the state their number one priority.  According to Russian analysts 
like the late Dmitry Furman the Russia-West struggle for influence in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) is a struggle of two diametrically opposed systems.  The 
Russian system is a system that has a “compelling need for a foreign policy enemy that 
seeks not only to weaken Russia but to block its return to great power status, particularly 
in the CIS.”175  The deployment of a TBMD system to Europe is viewed by the Siloviki 
                                                 
173 Geneive Abdo, “What an attack on Syria will mean for US-Iran relations: A strike on Assad would 
abort the recent "testing of the waters" between US and Iran since Rouhani's election.” Al Jazeera Blog, last 
updated September 10, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/09/201391011619723114.html.  
174 “The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why it Matters,” Anti-Defamation League, 
http://www.adl.org/israel-international/iran/c/the-iranian-nuclear-threat-why-it-matters.html. 
175 Blank, “The Sacred Monster,” 58. 
 62 
as that foreign policy enemy and the impediment to its return to their perceived right to 
be a great power state.  What the Siloviki fail to see is that their policy of realpolitik 
toward the United States has helped to foster the continuation of an environment of non-
cooperation.176 
Taking into account all that has been discussed above, the future of cooperation 
between the United States and the Russian Federation is possible, albeit at a level that is 
arguable less strategic in nature than the BMD debate.  Current events have shown that 
despite the security risk that the Russian Federation has expressed when it comes to the 
deployment of American ballistic missile defense systems to Europe, the United States 
and Russia are able to cooperate in areas like arms control.  In September 2013, the 
United States and the Russian Federation were able to complete bilateral negotiations on 
establishing an international coalition that would gain control and destroy Syria’s 
chemical weapons.177 When it comes to the BMD debate, my analysis shows that until 
the Russian Federation can make strides toward real conventional forces reform it will 
continue to rely on its nuclear capability to ensure its security. Also, as long as the 
Siloviki remain in control of Russia’s foreign policy-making, it will remain an imperative 
for them to protect the state at all costs, regardless of what it does to their standing with 
the outside world.    Also, as long as the United States remains the world hegemon and 
has the ability to increase its security with little to no regard for others, then the BMD 
debate will remain a source of contention between the United States and the Russian 
Federation.   
As Robert Jervis pointed out, “as long as DD is low, it leaves others with few 
hostages for its good behavior.  Others who are more vulnerable will grow apprehensive, 
which will lead them to acquire more arms and will reduce the chances of 
cooperation.”178 As I have shown this is the scenario being played out now with regards 
to Russian conventional and nuclear weapons, they have responded to U.S. BMD 
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deployments by arming the Topol-M missile with a multiple warhead system – in 2007 
Russia began tests of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was 
designated RS-24 with deployment beginning in 2010.179 In 2011, then President 
Medvedev listed a range of measures that the Russian Federation would take in response 
to American BMD deployments: Russia would commence “deployment of S-400 and S-
500 interceptors; [develop] the capability to attack NATO control systems for missile 
defense; and [deploy] modern weapons in locations where they could ‘take out any part 
of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe.  One step in this process will be to deploy 
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.’”180 
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